International Lawyer
Volume 2

Number 1

Article 26

1968

Decisions of International Tribunals
Eberhard Deutsch

Recommended Citation
Eberhard Deutsch, Decisions of International Tribunals, 2 INT'L L. 167 (1968)
https://scholar.smu.edu/til/vol2/iss1/26

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Lawyer by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

Case Comments
Decisions of International Tribunals
EBERHARD DEUTSCH,* DEPARTMENTAL EDITOR

There have been few significant recent developments in cases
pending in international tribunals. However, while most of the
decisions outlined below were rendered by national courts (in India
and Germany), all involve points of general international law applicable to proceedings, and frequently considered, in international
tribunals. They have accordingly been included in the within
discussion.
Proceedings in the International Court of Justice
In the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd.
proceeding between Belgium and Spain (General List No. 50),
Belgium filed its reply last May. The time-limit for the filing of the
Rejoinder of Spain has been fixed at October 24, 1967. The
Rejoinder is the final written pleading, and the case will be ready
for hearing when it is filed.
The proceeding, first instituted in 1958, discontinued pending
settlement negotiations in 1961, and resubmitted in 1962, involves
the contention of Belgium that the Canadian company at issue (majority-owned by Belgian nationals) was forced into bankruptcy in
1948 by the late Spanish financier Juan March, with connivance of
"certain Spanish authorities," for the purpose of facilitating a takeover by Sr. March. Relief sought is a declaration that the Spanish
State is obligated to annul the adjudication in bankruptcy and resulting judicial acts, and to respond in damages.
Institution of proceedings between The Netherlands and Denmark, respectively, and the Federal Republic of Germany (General
List Nos. 51 and 52), for declaration of principles governing de* The author is a member of the Bar of Louisiana, a graduate of Tulane

University, and Chairman of the Committee on Peace and Law Through the
United Nations.
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limitation of boundaries in the North Sea, was reported in the issue
of July 1967. The Federal Republic has filed its Memorials, and
the following persons have been appointed Agents of the parties:
Denmark-Mr. Bent Jacobsen, barrister at the Supreme Court
of Denmark
The Netherlands-Professor W. Riphagen, Legal Adviser to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Federal Republic-Professor Dr. Guenther Jaenicke, of the
Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main
The Countermemorials of Denmark and The Netherlands are
to be filed by February 20, 1968.
Commissioner of Income Tax v. H. E. H. Mir Osman Ali
Bahadur, All India Reporter 1966 Supreme Court 1260, involved
a claim by the Nizam of Hyderabad of exemption from income tax.
The Nizam based his claim on a provision of the Covenant-under
which Hyderabad became part of India-guaranteeing the Nizam all
of his personal privileges, dignities, and titles; and also, as to the
period prior to Hyderabad's accession to India, on an asserted principle of international law exempting sovereigns from taxation. The
Supreme Court, after holding that the Covenant provision encompassed only personal privileges of the Nizam as an ex-ruler, first
observed that the principle of immunity of sovereigns from taxation
is in a process of evolution, and that it has been suggested that such
exemption should not extend to commercial property and activities;
and that, stemming as it does from the general rule of sovereign immunity, it can no longer be considered an absolute, especially in
India, where foreign states and rulers may, by statute, be sued with
the consent of the Central Government.
However, the Court preferred to rest its decision on the holding that during the period at issue, Hyderabad was not a sovereign
state in the international sense, and that hence the Nizam was not
a sovereign ruler. The Court pointed out that during the British
regime, the Crown held suzerainty or paramountcy over all of India,
including the Indian States; that while the States were responsible
for their own internal administration, the Crown had charge of their
external relations and defense; and that the States had no international
status as such. The Court stated that the lapse of British suzerainty
pursuant to the Indian Independence Act of 1947 created a void,
leaving the position of the Indian States fluid, but not raising their
status to that of international personality.
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In Mammu v. State of Kerala, All India Reporter 1966 Supreme
Court 1614, a larger Bench of the Supreme Court, overruling a prior
holding by the Court, held that the word "migrated" in the Constitutional provision foreclosing Indian citizenship to those who
migrated to Pakistani territory after March 1, 1947, was used in
the broad sense of going from one place to another, not in the
narrower sense of moving with the intention of residing permanently
elsewhere; and that, accordingly, all persons who voluntarily moved
from India to Pakistan after March 1, 1947, other than those going
for some specific purpose for a short and limited period, are not
Indian citizens, regardless of whether they intended to remain permanently in Pakistan.
At issue in Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Union of
India, All India Reporter 1966 Supreme Court 1810, was the
question whether a contract had been made for purposes which were
exclusively purposes of Pakistan. The Indian Independence (Rights,
Property, and Liabilities) Order, 1947 provides, inter alia, with
reference to contracts made on behalf of the Governor-General in
Council before the partition of India, that such contracts made for
purposes which are exclusively purposes of Pakistan shall attach to
Pakistan, whereas all others shall attach to India. The contract in
question was for carriage of timber for railroad uses to Karachi;
the plaintiff sued the Union of India for freight due under the contract.
On findings that the timber was transported under the contract to
Pakistan, that it was in Pakistan on the partition date, that it was
all used in Pakistan and that it became the property of Pakistan upon
the partition, the Supreme Court held that the contract was exclusively
for purposes of Pakistan and that the Union of India had no liability
thereunder. In reaching this decision the Court reiterated its previously adumbrated tests attributing heavy weight to ownership of
the goods to which a contract relates, and, in the case of contracts
of carriage, the destination of the goods.
In Firm BansidharPremsukhdas v. State of Rajasthan, All India
Reporter 1967 Supreme Court 40, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
its consistent holding that a State, as state successor to another State
.(in the present case by merger of the latter into the former), is bound
only by those obligations of the merged State which it has expressly
assumed or recognized. The Court then held that even when such
obligations (in this case exemptions from custom duty) had initially
been recognized (in this case by continuance of the exemptions for
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. I
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a limited period), such recognition could validly be withdrawn and
the assumed liability terminated by subsequently enacted law; and
that the enactment of a general law with respect to customs duties,
making no provision for continuing the exemptions in question,
effectively superseded them.
In Zimmermann v. The FederalRepublic of Germany, 15 E.B.Z.
No. 6, pp. 46-58 (1966), the plaintiff sought recovery from the
Federal Republic, under the European Convention of Human Rights,
for his imprisonment in East Germany on a charge of sedition.
Rejecting his claim, the Federal Supreme Court held that Article I
of the Convention, guaranteeing protected rights to persons under
the sovereignty of a contracting State, refers only to the de facto
area of sovereignty, since it is only as to this area that a State could
be expected to undertake such a guaranty; and that Article 5(5),
giving aggrieved persons a direct right to claim damages, relates
only to infringements of rights by the public authorities who cannot
be held vicariously liable for the acts of persons over whom they have
no control.
In Boeckmans v. The Government of Belgium (1965), the
petitioner had been convicted and sentenced in Belgium for stealing
valuables from a lady almost 80 years old. His defense was that she
had given him most of the goods in consideration of his being her
lover. At the commencement of proceedings before the Belgian
Court of Appeal, the President of the Court, before the Court had
examined the merits of the case, characterized the defense as "improbable," "scandalous," "false," "ignoble," and "repugnant" and
warned Boeckmans that the Court would consider increasing his
sentence if the defense were not abandoned. Protesting that the
President had prejudged the case, Boeckmans' counsel refused to
argue the appeal, and the Court proceeded to enhance the sentence.
An appeal to the Cour de Cassation in the case was dismissed. The
European Commission held that Boeckmans' petition was admissible,
and set in motion its procedure for amicable settlement, in the course
of which the Belgian Government agreed that Boeckmans had not
had a fair hearing, in violation of the Convention of Human Rights,
and that he should be compensated.
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